Mihir Bhattacharya is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Ashoka University. He completed his postdoctoral research at the Aix-Marseille School of Economics in Marseille, France where he worked on axiomatic social choice and political economy. His present work explores the existence of constitutionally consistent voting rules and aggregation rules. He also works on applied theoretical models of electoral and political competition.

He received his PhD from the Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi with specialization in political economy and voting. He currently teaches one compulsory course on quantitative methods for economics and a course on axiomatic methods, fair division and welfare economics at Ashoka University.
  • Bhattacharya, M. (2019). Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains. Social Choice and Welfare, 52(2), 225-246.
  • Bhattacharya, M. (2018). A model of electoral competition between national and regional parties. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 30(3), 335-357.
  • Bhattacharya, M. (2016). Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators. Social Choice and Welfare, 46(4), 839-861.

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