

Abstracts

Mariam Abou Zahab, "Changing Patterns of Social and Political Life among the Tribal Pashtuns in Pakistan".

The paper discusses the change in sociology and pattern of leadership in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) since the arrival of Al Qaeda in the area after 9/11. The focus is on Waziristan which has become the hub of Al Qaeda and local and Afghan taliban. Drawing on social movements theories, my key argument is that the talibanisation of Waziristan might be analyzed as the outcome of a social movement among the Wazir tribesmen which started in the 1970s and was accelerated in the post 9/11 context by the emergence of "tribal entrepreneurs" who took advantage of a change of political opportunities and of their access to resources to contest the traditional leadership.

The paper, which is still work in progress, is just a starting point to develop the understanding of the internal dynamics of Pashtun tribal society. It first provides an outline of the changes which have occurred in the last two decades in the social and demographic structure of Waziristan. Then, I look at the developments in the post 9/11 environment and at the emergence of an alternative leadership and I discuss the new status of mullahs as political actors and arbitrators between the tribes and the State. Finally, I address the redefinition of Pashtun identity and the subordination of Pashtun nationalism to the politics of religious identity.

Zarin Ahmad, "Living on the Edge: A Study of the Muslim Butchers of Delhi".

While scholarly engagement with Islam and Muslims has increased worldwide, the interest of social scientists is largely focused on theological and ideological issues. Anthropological and sociological works focusing on the diversity of Muslim "societies" and "communities" and their patterns of formation still remain marginal. The present research aims at filling this gap through a qualitative research on the Muslim butchers of Delhi. It is an attempt to study the specificities of the community in its own idiom and to understand the differences and continuities that have evolved over the years among the Qureshi biradree of Delhi. The study draws on interviews, organizational literature and participant observation. For members of the Qureshi d biradree, kinship ties are strong socially and economically. Their trade and business environment offers them opportunities for success yet brings with it an amount of risk especially in the changing political cultural milieu.

Elisabeth Allès and Leïla Chebbi, "Islam in China: New Tendencies, New Religious Practices and their Impact Through Education and Internet".

Since the 1980s, the Chinese speaking Muslims (called Hui) have shown a large dynamism in their religious activities. They have opened mosques, religious schools, went to the pilgrimage, organized more links with the Muslim world, published books and translations, sent students to Islamic universities, used new media such as Internet. This vitality seemed to bring Chinese Islam closer to a "global Islam". The questions which arose were: at the beginning of the 21st century is this standardization of Islam confirmed? Would one attend an obliteration of the diversity of Chinese Islam? In addition which degree of autonomy is possible within the Chinese political framework for an Islam in minority situation? To answer, we will focus on education, on the courses of students in China and abroad and on the use of Internet by the new generation of Chinese Muslims. The reason for going to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Iran or Malaysia is often to find a better future by getting a job or creating a company. Some of these students come back and try to spread salafi ideas, others want to give a new religious impulsion inside the traditional Qadim, others develop Sufi brotherhoods. Scholars, Ahong, individually or in group, all use Internet and have opened a lot of websites. Those various actors and the online interaction they stimulate are fostering a wide range of religious interpretations. In this beginning of the 21st century one can note that Chinese Islam is not engaged in a process of total standardization. Thanks to the vitality of a new generation of religious persons in charge (the forty years ones), there is a maintenance of diversity through the permanence of its tendencies. On the other side, one observes a great capacity of adaptation to the new social and political context as well as permeability between the tendencies. However, the individual experiments of the exchanges with the Umma, (pilgrimage, studies, work) reinforce a national feeling, a feeling of membership in the Chinese world.

Bayram Balci, "Official vs. Parallel Islam? The Political Uses of Sunnism and Shiism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan".

As in the rest of the former Soviet Union, Islam has been going through a revival in Azerbaijan from the end of the 1980s onwards, due to a more liberal political environment in the context of the Perestroïka. The independence of the Azeri Republic, in 1991, has reinforced this process of religious revival and has enabled Islam to become more visible in the public sphere, which until then was under tight control of the state.

This relative freedom of religion brought up by independence has contributed to the rise of more or less politicized religious movements which have often come into conflict with the state, which has been unable to impose its unique model of official Islam. However, these movements, be they Sunni or Shia, have not been able to promote an alternative political project and they disagree on the ways Islam should be practiced in everyday life. The weakness of these movements, the prevalence of a Sunni/Shia cleavage among them and the attitude of the state jointly contribute to the political impotence of political Islam in Azerbaijan.

Romain Bertrand, "Transnational Networks of Radical Islam in Southeast Asia. A Case-Study: The "Terrorist Career" of the Bali Bombings' Mastermind, Imam Samudra".

Abdul Aziz, alias Imam Samudra, has been sentenced to death on August 11, 2003 by the High Court of Denpasar (Bali) for its role in planning - or rather "masterminding" - the October 2002 bombings in Kuta (South Bali, 202 deaths, mainly Australian

tourists). Nicknamed the "Smiling Bomber" by the international media after he gladly acknowledged his responsibility in the attacks, Imam Samudra is sometimes considered as epitomizing the frightening "nihilism" of a new generation of vagrant djihadists, trained in terrorist technicalities in Northern Pakistan and Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and bound to the fulfillment of a dreadful but carefully designed "global" anti-Western (that's to say anti-US and anti-Jewish) agenda. To engage with the issue of the degree of transnationalization of radical islam groups in Southeast Asia, the case of Imam Samudra is all the more interesting, since, thanks to his autobiography and deep local media coverage, we get plenty of detailed information regarding his whole "terrorist career". That notion - that will be further elaborated in the presentation - basically is an appeal to address the issue of radical Islamist commitments from a strictly sociological and historical point of view: it sticks to the idea that before turning to the hypothesis of the "pathological" nature of radical Islamists, one should always first make use of all the analytical weapons of "ordinary" historical sociology. The life-story of Imam Samudra hence sheds some light on the genealogy of radical Islam networks in Southeast Asia : Imam Samudra's family background connects him to the separatist-islamist guerilla movement of the Darul Islam (1948-1962) and to the reformist hardliners of PERSIS (Persatuan Islam, founded 1923). He was trained in the MANs (Public Islamic Colleges), that became his main "recruitment" field, and came under the influence of anti-modernist "kyais" (ulamas) only intermitently. His commitment to violence-prone and anti-State islam has to do with a peculiar political history: that of the struggles and debates surrounding the very nature of the State in post-Independence Indonesia, from the Darul Islam times to the mid-1980s fight between the authoritarian New Order State and the DDII-bred fundamentalist propagandists. The defeat of the islamist parties in the June 7 1999 elections - the first post-Suharto, "Reformasi", free'n fair polls - also had a strong radicalizing effect on Java-based militant islam networks. Even if he traveled to Afghanistan in the early 1990s, Imam Samudra therefore is very much the son of a homegrown, nationalist and "inward-looking" anti-Republican militant Islam, whose main targets still are the Chinese-Indonesian Christian minorities (the "non-pribumi" peranakan). His social characteristics also are of some interest, if only to keep at bay the "poverty / radicalization" over-simplistic equation. Imam Samudra indeed is not a backward "slum boy" but the son of well-to-do petty traders from rural Western Java. And he's not a "socially frustrated *laisse-pour-compte*" of disruptive modernization processes, but a successful immigrant who graduated as a "dosen" (assistant-professor) in Peninsular Malaysia and who made a living as a textile trader in Johore Baru.

Michel Boivin & Laurent Gayer, "Drifting Away from Political Islam: The Nationalist Secularisation of Pakistan's Mohajirs".

After the 1947 Partition, the Census Board of Pakistan gave the name "*Mohajir*" (Arabic for "immigrant") to those Indian Muslims who had settled there. With the passage of time, some of these migrants (the Urdu and Gujarati speaking urban population of Sindh, which provided the new state of Pakistan with its economic, bureaucratic and political elites in the first two decades of independence) came to accept this definition of themselves as a separate category. The indigenisation of the Pakistani state, in the 1970s, marginalized this privileged minority, both in the affairs of the state and in its economy. It is in this context that second generation Mohajirs started to assert their distinct "ethnic" identity. This conversion to ethno-nationalism led Mohajir youths to break away from political Islam, in which their parents had found a sense of belonging, which compensated for their lack of a distinct identity and of a social base in the country. By breaking away from this "islamo-nationalism", second generation Mohajirs thus went through a process of "nationalist secularisation", which has led them to become the most vocal opponents of religious parties and jihadist organizations in Pakistan. However, even if they maintain that religious matters should be a purely private affair, Mohajir nationalists have not entirely given

up the political use of religion. The founder and leader of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), Altaf Hussain, has been using the Sufi idiom of devotion to assert his authority and strengthen his charisma. Shia influences can also be detected in the rhetoric and body language of Altaf Hussain, who drew his inspiration from Shia *ulema* and left-wing intellectuals. Yet, this strategic use of religious idioms is not so original in the Pakistani context, and the specificity of the political discourse of the MQM should be searched elsewhere, particularly in its cult of the martyrs, which is in stark contrast with the *jihadis'* concepts of martyrdom.

Gilles Boquérat & Nazir Hussain, "'Enlightened Moderation': A New Paradigm in the Face of Militant Islam".

Musharraf's 'Enlightened Moderation' did not come into being in a vacuum but is the result of domestic compulsions and international constraints, both characterized by a threatening radical Islam. EM does not deviate from the centrality of Islam in the Pakistani polity but tries to project a forward-looking image in a country often perceived as a haven for religious extremism. As such, it is in line with a history of confrontation between the modernists and the clergy. The aim of this study is to analyze the concept and its timing, its credibility in the eyes of the intellectual and student communities, its implementation and limitations, and it ultimately questions its relevance and its capacity to oppose the hardliners.

Rémi Castets, "Islam and Politics among the Uyghurs: Interactions and Recompositions along the 20th Century"

This preliminary study will explore the interactions between Islam and politics among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang along the 20th century. First, we will try to evaluate in which way the diffusion of modernist ideologies and the changing of political frames have favoured the recomposition of the Islamic scene. We will shed light on the evolution of Islam status as well as on the balance of power between Islamic currents, especially between Sufi and non-Sufi Islam.

Second, since its conquest by Qing armies in the mid 18th century, Xinjiang has been affected by countless insurrections launched in the name of Islam. We will intent to evaluate if the recent policies of Chinese central power aimed at putting Islamic clerics under control, limiting their influence on society and forbidding practices and thoughts that could be subversive have provoked in reaction a reassertion of Islam inside Uyghur anti-colonial opposition networks. Indeed, since panturkism and communist nationalities policy have taken roots in the region, Islam has largely been pledged to nationalism. Bearing in mind this crucial fact, we will analyse both the forms taken by the reassertion of Islam in politics and to what extent Chinese authorities tend to instrumentalise this marginal trend in the post September 11th context.

Rémy Delage, "Reform and Agency: Educational Trajectories of Young Muslims in Contemporary India".

This paper deals with Muslim educational institutions and their reform process in contemporary India, with an emphasis on religious seminaries (*madrasas*). It seeks to describe how the educational landscape of religious minorities has been transformed since the colonial period and to analyse the genealogy of educational policies since independence. In the context wherein the State seeks to modernize the education of Muslims in the name of social empowerment, this paper draws ethnographical data from an experimental *madrasa* located in Jaipur. This educational project is innovative not only because it has been initiated by Muslims but also as it seeks to bridge the gap between religious and secular knowledge while combining in an original fashion, in its syllabus, Islamic and non-religious subjects. Another feature of this *madrasa* lies in its aim to transfer sufficient capacity to its students to better face the job market

without inhibition or a sense of social discrimination. But careful analysis reveals that the educational trajectories of young Muslim graduates from *madrasas* fluctuate between the two opposite dimensions of the process of identity assignation and agency or the capacity of individuals to emancipate from a set of structural constraints. This papers ends with the assumption that the conflicts of representation around the categories of reform and religious seminaries, which are expressed in competing discourses, public policies and community initiatives, lead eventually to the redefinition of the status of Muslims as a minority, in a multicultural society.

Habiba Fathi, "Islam and Politics in Central Asia: New Players, New Ideological Discourses and New Issues?"

Here we consider two directions of analysis. The former is to analyse the doctrine of Central Asian *wahhabi*, as it was conceived during Soviet time by the theology figures, most of which originate from the Uzbek part of the Ferghana valley. The *wahhabi* doctrine, which is locally named "mujaddidiyya-wahhabiyya", is one of the main sources of inspiration for all the radical Islamic groups and organizations who came on the Central Asian political stage between the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. The groups which are most commonly known are: the Party of Islamic rebirth of Tajikistan (PIRT), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMO), a transnational organization ally of Taleban and al-Qaeda, the *Hizb al-Tahrir al-islami* (HTI) or the Party of liberation of Islam, another clandestine transnational organization of Middle-Eastern origin, as well as Akramiyya. Actually, it is difficult to perceive the influence of the abovementioned groups and organizations without looking at their relation to this doctrine. The latter direction is to measure the influence of the Central Asian *wahhabi* doctrine on the HTI in Kyrgyzstan, an organization which is developing in the whole central Asian region despite a globally hostile context.

Agnès de Féo, "Muslims in Cambodia: Religious Revival through Transnational Islamic Groups since 1991".

Despite their minority status, the role of Muslims in Cambodian society is far to be negligible. Warmly welcomed by the Khmer monarchs as they were immigrating to the country, Cham and Chvea have, in spite of some insurrectionary episodes, pledged the monarchy's allegiance and got access to important positions within the state, administration and army. From the 17th century until today, some Muslims have held positions at the highest levels of the state, like those of minister and vice-Prime Minister. About twenty Chams currently sit in the Parliament and in the government. The Cham did know how to integrate themselves by adopting the taboo jobs of the Khmer. Indeed, the Buddhists being able to eat animals but being not authorized to kill them, the Cham have embraced the careers of slaughtermen and butchers, while perpetuating their traditional profession of fishermen. King Sihanouk integrated them into the Cambodian nation by creating during the Independence, in 1953, the name of "Khmer Islam" in order to group the Cham and Chvea together under the Khmer identity.

From the 1993 general elections organized under the aegis of the UN, some Cham recently appointed to government positions launched a wide call to all Muslim countries through their respective associations. By doing so, they hoped to collect enough funds to rebuild a Muslim community that became moribund at the end of the war, and after ten years of Vietnamese occupation. The Islamic NGOs, most of them financed by the Persian Gulf's states, entered then the country by importing in it a Middle East religious form that the Cham name "Wahhabit".

Frédéric Grare, "Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism in Balochistan".

At a time when most issues in the Muslim world are analyzed almost exclusively from a religious perspective, the Balochistan conflict constitutes a somewhat refreshing anomaly, a welcome reminder that if Islam is undeniably an important aspect of the regional identity, it is not the only, nor even the main component of its political identity. The Baloch conflict suggests on the contrary that the layers of Pakistan's various identities have not yet all merged in a common Islamic one, and that the Islamization process initiated by Zia has, so far, been more successful in changing Western perceptions of Pakistan than its ground reality. But neither was the formation of Baloch nationalism, nor its recent resurgence articulated around any religious sentiment.

KARAM, "Socio Economic Conditions of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh".

Uttar Pradesh with a population of 174.7 millions as per 2001 census is one of the five states with largest Muslim population concentration (18.2 %). The three-sample districts Muzaffarnagar (rank 10), Baharaich (rank 35) and Azamgarh (rank 55) are among the top ranking hundred Muslim populated ones. The objective of this work is to assess the public program implementation and their reach with respect to education, health and economic status of Muslims as compared to Hindus. Urdu is debated as the dominant language of Muslims, but only 10 percent of Muslim HHs reported the use of Urdu as the main language even within families. Generally the residences are segregated by religion in rural areas, but in Muslim dominated villages they are living in a mixed neighborhood. In the places, where Muslim population is very small they are marginalized, feel neglected and their social status is below SC Hindus. In all districts and over all ages, the percentage of literate males is more among Hindus than Muslims, but there is no much difference for females. The Muslim children start attending the Madarsa at the age of 3 to 4 years and there were some children who don't go to the formal school but attended Madarsa only. Of the ICDS enrolled children, almost all Hindus get the food supplement services, but most of the Muslim children reported not receiving the food supplement. Education level and employment of Hindus is better than that of Muslims. Lack of interest in studies is the main reason reported for drop out of education and lack of funds is the second reason by both religions.

More Muslim women need the permission to visit a doctor and need male escort than Hindu women. The average distance to be traveled for medical help in case of difficult delivery is more for Muslims than Hindus. Both communities prefer private doctors for medication and second preference is chemist. Private doctors were mostly untrained and unqualified. Average cost of treatment of recent past episode of illness was higher for Hindus than Muslims and it is related to the income levels of the districts. Private practitioners immunized about 83 percent of the population and the private practitioners were preferred more by Muslims than Hindus. The remaining gets it from public health system. The family planning was voluntarily adopted by both religions, though Hindus practice more. The government health system is not playing significant role in family planning. The Muslims have self-contradictions and have religious confusions about the acceptance or not of family planning.

Average per capita expenditure of Hindus is substantially higher than that of Muslims in Muzaffarnagar while this difference is small for Baharaich. In Azamgarh, the expenditure of Muslim HHs is slightly higher than that of Hindu HHs. Muslims spend more money than Hindus on meat and eggs in all districts. On almost all other items Hindu's expenditure is more. Savings are more among Hindu households than Muslim households. Public schemes to help the needy individuals and the community are implemented in all districts, but some amount has to be dolled out to get individual benefit under these schemes. The average income of both religions is similar in

Muzaffarnagar district and in other two districts the average income of Hindus is substantially higher than Muslims. The average number of children per women is substantially higher for Muslims (4.32) than Hindus (3.45), but son preference is more prevalent among Hindus than Muslims. The female children born to the Hindu women died 18 percent more than male children and for Muslims there is no such variation by gender. About 84 and 78 percent of Hindu and Muslim women reported to have received the pre-natal care for their last birth. About half of the deliveries were institutional in Azamgarh, one fourth in Muzaffarnagar and only ten percent in Baharaich. Seventy five percent of the Muslims prefer marrying in relations is the important social practice of Muslims. On the other hand, celebrating the birth of a male child (son preference) is the important practice as per majority of Hindus.

Omar Khalidi, "Entrepreneurs from Outside the Traditional Mercantile Communities: Muslims in India's Private Sector".

Scholarship has focused on Muslim entrepreneurship merely on mercantile groups such as the various sects, sub-sects of Bohras, Khojas, Labbes and Memons based mainly on the western and southern coasts of India. For the longest times these were the famed mercantile groups. Due to sectarian and cultural differences, the aforesaid groups did not offer a role model for the rest of the Muslims. What about the new group of small-scale entrepreneurs operating in inland upper India and the interior Deccan? There is now increasing evidence that a group of Muslims are emerging as result of the market-friendly environment as first-generation entrepreneurs. Many are real-estate developers, hoteliers, in pharmaceuticals and in information technology. A few with traditional skills in handicrafts and weaving have transformed from mere workers to business-owners, by passing the middlemen. My paper will examine this group of upwardly mobile, self-confident, and enterprising group of Muslim untied by sect, clan or family connections. The sources of information for this paper includes interviews and examination of business directories of cities and towns in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnakata, Kashmir, and Maharashtra.

Adil Mehdi, "The Imaginary Taliban: Indian Madrasas and the Spectre of Terrorism".

The paper deals with the allegation of terrorism and fundamentalism against madrasas in India since the rise of the Taliban in late 1990s and since 9/11. The fact that the Taliban mainly emerged from Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan made the source madrasa Darul al 'Ulum at Deoband and other Indian madrasas obvious suspects because of ideological and historical connections. It happened at the time when the general environment was hostile against the Muslims and the Hindu rightwing party the BJP was in power. There were endless reports in media linking madrasas to international terrorism and characterising them as centres of radical, fundamentalist Islam. I carried out an extensive field work in nearly a hundred madrasas in five states in North and Northeast India to investigate these reports. I found these allegations to be largely without any substance whatsoever; on the contrary I found that the madrasas were well integrated with the local communities, both Muslims and non Muslims.

There were several reasons for such a negative perception about madrasas. Apart from obvious historical, political and social factors that exist in India with regard to the Muslims in general, the madrasas also had no means to effectively counter allegations against them. All the reports and analysis of madrasas took place in English or to some extent in Hindi language media which madrasas are completely ignorant about while they mounted their defence in Urdu language which is barely read by anyone outside traditional Muslim community. So there is an unbridgeable linguistic divide. In reaction to these very persistent allegations about militancy,

outdated curriculum and tainted sources of funding, the madrasas took several steps like not allowing admission to students from Kashmir without a no objection certificate from their district authorities (foreign students are already banned by the government); they have started maintaining accounts certificated by a chartered accountant and have responded to calls for modernisation by starting English language and computer courses though only for handful of students.

Perhaps, the most positive outcome of the pressure on madrasas is the debate on reforms but as long as it is linked to nullifying the possible threat of terrorism (even in the absence of any hard evidence) it is unlikely to result in any meaningful transformation.

Aminah Mohammad-Arif, Amélie Blom & Jérémie Codron, "The 'Re-Islamisation' of the Muslim Youth in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: Intimate and Militant Trajectories".

Re-Islamisation- a self-conscious identification to Islam, often considered as a "new birth" by the actors themselves - has been fairly well studied amongst young Muslims in Europe and the United States since the late 1980s. However, in the countries of emigration, like India, Pakistan or Bangladesh, the focus has primarily been laid on militant Islamic organizations whilst their very base - the Muslim urban youth -, and more generally the very issue of how they live and understand their faith, has been largely neglected. The collective work presented here is, first and foremost, an attempt to (partially) fill this gap. It explores, from a sociological and anthropological angle, the process of "re Islamisation" as presently experienced in South Asia by a significant number of young people.

This research is based on qualitative, rather than quantitative, interviews with 15 to 20 "re-Islamised" young men and women in each country. We are not claiming that our findings are representative of "the" re-Islamised youth of South Asia as methodologically speaking this would be indefensible and dangerous. Our analysis instead focuses on the "new-born" Muslim life trajectories and subjectivities; it places a greater emphasis on the very significance that a quest for a life made "perfect" by Islam has for the youths. This quest is understood in its intimate as well as militant dimensions (some young people belonged to particular Islamic organizations while others were not affiliated with any movement whatsoever). The transition (or lack of transition) from one dimension to the other is, in fact, a major point of discussion. We also insist on the tremendous diversity of the "re-Islamised group", in terms of the markers and vectors of re-Islamisation, as well as in terms of practice and the very meaning this process has for the youths. Of particular importance is, also, the temporal and spatial scope of this "new birth", ie. the continuity or rupture with the past as well as the articulation between the local and the global. Finally, we highlight the main sociological incentives to "go back to Islam" (the need to resolve tensions between modernity and tradition but also to initiate a "soft rebellion") as well as the crucial role emotions play in the process.

Juliette Van Wassenhove, "Modernisation, Middle Classes and Discourses on Islam in Malaysia: Examples of Readers' Letters to the Editor of an Online Daily".

The Malaysian experience is quite singular among Muslim nations: not only has the country managed economic success, but in doing so, it has enhanced its Islamic characteristics – even though Muslims only amount to roughly 60% of the population. During the last thirty years, the economy has undergone a quick-paced modernisation, while society was experiencing a multi-faceted « Islamic revival », which the State has tried and channelled into extensive public islamisation policies. As a major consequence, authentic middle classes were born out of these evolutions,

comprising a consistent Muslim group. They have been on the receiving end of a growing number of discourses on Islam, many of which became increasingly conservative, as the State tried to shape an interpretative monopoly on Islam, and met with contestation, especially from the Islamist opposition party, PAS.

Studies abound on how political or civil society organisations partake in the debate on Islam, but little is known on how « ordinary », non-militant Muslims feel about this publicisation of religion. One source, that had yet never been explored, offers a unique point of observation on this matter: thousands of letters have been sent to the internet daily Malaysiakini.com to be published in its forum, Islam and its translation into public policies being one of the top three subjects written about. Given the composition of the online newspaper readership, this collection provides a sample of the ideas with which the new Malaysian middle classes – often said to be consumerist and little concerned with public debate – engage with this issue. The letters show a highly modern interrogation on the related constitutions of the self and community, both political and religious. They express a distancing towards official discourses on Islam while the usual dividing line between radicalism and the desire of a multicultural community of citizens gets blurred.